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Under section 1123(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, when confirming a plan of
reorganization, it is well established that all claimants are required to receive equality of
treatment, meaning that “all class members receive equal value and pay the same consideration
in exchange for their distributions.”2 Yet, multiple courts have held that this does not mean that
all claimants are required to receive equality of result.3 Section 1123(a)(4) is satisfied “if
claimants in the same class have the same opportunity to recover.”4 This means that if a plan
subjects all members of the same class to the same means of claim determination, it is sufficient
to satisfy the requirements of section 1123(a)(4).5
“The key inquiry under § 1123(a)(4) is not whether all of the claimants in a class obtain
the same thing, but whether they have the same opportunity.”6 In In re Dana Corp., a portion of
the claimant’s in a particular class reached settlement agreements with the debtor, and as a result,
they received far less than their full claims, while those who did not settle did receive their full
claims.7 Yet, the court held that the chapter 11 plan did not violate section 1123(a)(4) even
though the claimants did not agree to less favorable treatment, because all the claimants in the
same class had the same opportunity to settle their claims.8
Additionally, a reorganization plan that implemented a lottery system that would divide
all of the creditors into seven classes and established “a mandatory redemption schedule under

In re Breitburn Energy Partners LP, 582 B.R. 321, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
See id; In re W.R. Grace & Co., 729 F.3d 311, 327 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[C]ourts have interpreted the ‘same treatment’
requirement to mean that all claimants in a class must have ‘the same opportunity’ for recovery.”); In re Central
Med. Ctr., Inc., 122 B.R. 568, 574 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990).
4 See In re Breitburn, 582 B.R. at 358.
5 See In re Central Med., 122 B.R. at 575.
6 See Ad Hoc Committee of Personal Injury Asbestos Claimants v. Dana Corp., (In re Dana Corp.), 412 B.R. 53, 62
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).
7 See id.
8 See id; In re Joint Eastern and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litigation, 982 F.2d 721, 749 (2d Cir.1992) (“the ‘same
treatment’ standard of section 1123(a)(4) does not require that all claimants within a class receive the same amount
of money.”).
2
3

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439

which a given number of bonds are randomly selected by the trustee to be redeemed each year”
has also been found to satisfy the requirements of Section 1123(a)(4).9 To elaborate, under this
lottery system the creditors who were chosen first would receive a more favorable interest rate
than those bondholders chosen to be paid later and therefore they would receive different
amounts of money.10 However, the court found that section1123(a)(4) simply requires that a plan
subject class members to the same process for claim satisfaction, not that the process must yield
the same pecuniary result for each class member.11
Accordingly, while it is well established that members of a certain class do not have to
receive the same compensation under a reorganization plan, they must be subject to the same
process in determining that compensation.
II.

Circuit Courts find that Reorganization Plan may Treat Certain Creditors More
Favorable Without Violating Section 1123(a)(4).

An issue of interpretation arises when certain class members are treated better than others
because they have provided some new form of consideration in exchange for that better
treatment. Because the Supreme Court has never defined what exactly equal treatment requires
under the Bankruptcy Code, and because the Bankruptcy Code itself has never provided a
standard for equal treatment, this is the question that the circuit courts are beginning to address
and create a standard for.12 Under this interpretation, a reorganization plan does not violate
section 1123(a)(4) if it treats creditors within the same class differently if that favorable
treatment is in exchange for a “valuable new commitment” by the creditor.13 The Second, Fifth,

In re Central Med., 122 B.R. at 574.
See id.
11 See id. at 575 (“[T]he Plan affords all bondholders the opportunity to participate in the same random lottery
system. The fact that some may ultimately receive more money than others is merely a consequence of a system that
was applied equally to all members of that class.”).
9

10

In re Peabody Energy Corporation, 933 F.3d 918, 925 (8th Cir. 2019); Ahuja, 644 F. App'x at 24; In re Cajun, 150
F.3d at 503; In re Acequia, 787 F.2d at 1352.
13 See In re Peabody, 933 F.3d at 925.
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Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have found that it is in fact possible for a plan to treat certain creditors
more favorable without violating the equal treatment rule.
One way a creditor may provide “valuable new commitment” to satisfy this standard is if
it had a secured claim separate from its equity interest.14 For example, in the Second Circuit, the
court addressed the question of whether a plan of reorganization violated the equal treatment
standard where senior creditors were paid more than their claims were worth and found that the
plan was permissible. The Court held that there was no violation because the senior creditors that
were treated more favorably had not received that extra value in the reorganization for its
common equity interests, “but rather for its secured claim against LightSquared Inc. and the
causes of action against third parties that it agreed to attribute to reorganized LightSquared.”15
So, because the equity holder had a secured claim separate from its equity interest and had
agreed to attribute to the reorganized debtor “certain causes of action against third parties,” it
was permissible that they were treated more favorably than other equity holders within their
class.16
The Fifth and Ninth Circuit have both held similarly in cases going as far back as 1986.17
The Ninth Circuit established that if a claimant in a particular class is receiving preferential
treatment over other claimants in the class, the inequality is permissible as long as the treatment
is the result of something other than her ownership interest as a shareholder.18 In In re Acequia,
Inc., the reorganization plan classified two separate shareholders in the same class but denied
only one of those shareholders the right to “participate in management of the Debtor as an officer
or director.”19 The less favored shareholder argued that this restriction on his shares violated the

See Ahuja, 644 F. App'x at 24.
See id. at 29.
16 See id.
17 See In re Cajun, 150 F.3d 503; In re Acequia, 787 F.2d 1352.
18 See In re Acequia, 787 F.2d at 1363.
19 Id. at 1362.
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equal treatment rule, but the Ninth Circuit found otherwise. The Court found that because the
shareholder’s “position as director and officer of the Debtor is separate from her position as an
equity security holder” and the preferential treatment was tied to her service to the debtor as a
director and officer of the debtor, rather than to her ownership interest as a shareholder, the
preferential treatment was permissible.20
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit has found reimbursement of expenses incurred in a
bankruptcy case to the claimants is enough to permit favorable treatment of certain claimants.21
In In re Cajun, the court found that even though the debtor made additional payments to one
claimant resulting in a more favorable treatment, “the payments were not made in satisfaction of
the … members' claims against Cajun, but rather as reimbursement for plan and litigation
expenses incurred in the bankruptcy case.”22 So, because the payments were made for a purpose
other than to satisfy the claimants claims against the debtor, the favorable treatment was
permissible.
The Eighth Circuit is the most recent circuit court to adopt this interpretation of the equal
treatment rule. In In re Peabody, the Eighth Circuit seemed to summarize the fellow circuits
interpretations and create a more clear-cut rule, in holding that “a reorganization plan may treat
one set of claim holders more favorably than another so long as the treatment is not for the claim
but for distinct, legitimate rights or contributions from the favored group separate from the
claim.”23 In doing so, the Eighth Circuit distinguished In re Peabody from Lasalle, where the
Supreme Court “rejected a reorganization plan that gave a debtor’s prebankruptcy equity holders
the exclusive opportunity to receive ownership interests in the reorganized debtor if the equity

See id. at 1363.
See In re Cajun, 150 F.3d at 518.
22 See id.
23 In re Peabody, 933 F.3d at 925.
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holders would invest new money in the reorganized debtor.”24 In distinguishing LaSalle, the
Eighth Circuit seemingly laid out three essential criteria that must be met in order to satisfy §
1123(a)(4).25 First, the claimant that is treated less favorably must not be excluded from any
opportunity that is afforded to the claimant that receive preferential treatment. Second, the
creditors that receive preferential treatment must give up something of value in exchange for said
preferential treatment. Finally, the debtor must consider alternative ways to raise capital other
than through providing preferential treatment.26 For these reasons, the Eighth Circuit found that
Lasalle does not imply that there are no circumstances under which a plan may treat claimants
differently within the same class.
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding that under section 1123(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, a plan of
reorganization must “provide the same treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class,
unless the holder of a particular claim or interest agrees to a less favorable treatment of such
particular claim or interest,” the circuit courts are beginning to carve out a way for debtors to
provide certain creditors with special treatment. The Eighth Circuit has laid out the three
requirements that are needed to satisfy the requirement under this developing interpretation: (1)
the claimant that is treated less favorably must not be excluded from any opportunity that is
afforded to the claimant that receive preferential treatment; (2) the creditors that receive
preferential treatment must give up something of value in exchange for said preferential
treatment; and (3) the debtor must consider alternative ways to raise capital other than through
providing preferential treatment.27

See id.; Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass’n v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, 526 U.S. 434,
456 (1999).
25 See In re Peabody, 933 F.3d at 926.
26 See id.
27 See id.
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